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Abstract
We are the first to confirm that sufficient cost convexity in a Stackelberg model generates
profitable mergers between two leaders and between two followers. Moreover, the degree of
convexity required for leaders to merge is generally far smaller than that required for
followers. Most importantly, the structure of the stage game means that the convexity
required for either two followers or two leaders to merge is less than that required for two
Cournot competitors.
Derivations and simulations rely on Maple 8 and all programs are availabe from the authors.
Citation: Heywood, John S. and Matthew McGinty, (2007) "Mergers among leaders and mergers among followers." Economics
Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 12 pp. 1-7
Submitted: June 4, 2007.  Accepted: June 4, 2007.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2007/volume12/EB-07L10017A.pdf1. Introduction 
 
Salant et al. (1983) examined a model of n identical Cournot competitors with linear costs of 
which m merge.  They demonstrate that only in the unlikely event that more than 80 percent of 
the market merges could the participants earn profits as a result of the merger.  This 
demonstration gave rise to a literature on "the merger paradox" and to a prolonged effort to 
identify alternative models in which mergers can be profitable.
1  Huck et al. (2001) retain linear 
costs but adopt a Stackelberg model with m leaders and n-m followers. They show that if a leader 
merges with a follower, the merged firm earns more profit than its two pre-merger component 
firms.   Yet, for all other types of mergers, followers merging with each other or leaders merging 
with each other, two firm mergers will never be profitable if there remains even a single 
excluded firm of the type merging (leaders or followers).  In this paper, we modify the 
Stackelberg model of Huck et al. (2001) to allow for convex costs and focus on the possibility of 
profitable mergers between two followers and between two leaders. 
Perry and Porter (1985) show that with sufficiently convex costs two Cournot 
competitors out of n can profitably merge. Yet, Heywood and McGinty (2007b) emphasize that 
the required degree of convexity typically remains unrealistically large.  For example, in order 
for two Cournot firms out of ten to profitably merge, a linear marginal cost curve must have a 
slope more than 22 times as steep as the demand curve.  In the results that follow, we are the first 
to show that in a Stackelberg model with n firms, sufficient convexity generates profitable 
mergers between two leaders and between two followers.  Moreover, the degree of convexity 
required for two leaders to merge is generally far smaller than that required for two followers to 
merge.  Most importantly, the structure of the stage game means that the degrees of convexity 
required for either two followers to merge or for two leaders to merge are each less than that 
required for two of n Cournot competitors to merger.  Thus, given convex costs, profitable 
merger between similar firms is more likely in a market characterized by Stackelberg leadership.  
This implication does not emerge from comparing Stackelberg to Cournot under the assumption 
of linear costs. 
  In what follows, the next section introduces the model presenting the equilibria.  The 
third section compares the influence of merger on profit isolating the central regularities for 
mergers of two firms.  A final section concludes. 
 
2.  Model Set-up and Equilibrium 
 
Following Huck et al. (2001), we imagine an industry of n firms facing a linear demand curve: P 
= 1 – Q, where Q = .  The firms play a quantity Stackelberg game with m leaders 
and n – m followers.  Following Perry and Porter (1985), all firms share the same convex cost 
schedule:C  generating linear marginal cost curves with slope c.  We consider a 
merger of two firms, either two leaders or two followers, resulting in n -1 post merger firms. We 
do not consider the case of a follower merging with a leader because Huck et al. (2001) have 
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1These attempts to resolve the paradox include adopting Bertrand competition  (Deneckere and 
Davidson 1985), assuming two firms merging creates a leader (Daugherty 1990), adopting 
spatial competition (Rothschild et al. 2000), and considering merged firms that sequence output 
decisions across plants  (Huck et al. 2004; Creane and Davidson 2004). 
 
  1shown it to be profitable in the linear case, a result that carries over to the case with convex 
costs.  We take the original number of firms n to be exogenous which allows us to ignore the 
fixed cost and set f=0 in the cost schedules.  Indeed, as Perry and Porter (1985) make clear, 
adopting a positive fixed cost does not change in any way the incentives for merger because the 
merged firm would retain the fixed costs from each of its constituent parts.  
The critical comparison determining the profitability of merger in our model will be the 
sum of profits earned by two of the n pre merger firms and the profit earned by the post merger 
firm.  The pre-merger equilibrium price, quantities and profits are: 
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In the post-merger equilibrium, the n-2 firms excluded from the merger have cost 
functions  but the merged firm retains 2 plants each with that same cost function.  
The resulting composite cost function of the two-plant firm is  .  This 
function reflects the underlying advantage of being able to direct output across multiple plants.  
Note, however, that if the output of the merged firm remained identical to that of its constituent 
pre-merger firms,  , the total cost to produce that output would be unchanged. The 
merger by itself does not immediately provide cost savings.   
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The point of the merger remains to reduce output to exploit market power.  We first consider 
the case of two leaders merging.  There will now be three types of firms: the merged leader, the 
m - 2 excluded leaders and the n - m followers.  The equilibrium resulting from n-2 firms with 
 and one firm with   can be easily characterized but the expressions are very long 
(available from the authors upon request). As a point of reference, if c=1 the pre-merger profit of 
a leader from (1) can be compared with the profit of the merged leader: 
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While it can be established that the merged profit is larger, the critical comparison for any c 
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Only when this expression is positive is there profit from merger.  While the full expression for 
(2) for any c is also available from the authors, we note that   collapses to exactly  ) 0 , , ( = c m n g
L
  2the profit expression for a merger among leaders as presented by Huck et al. (2001) for the case 
of linear costs:  .   To take an example with 
convex costs that can be calculated from (2) and (3), when n=6, m=3, c=1, the pre-merger leader 
profit,  , is .0213 and the profit of the merged leader,  , is .0429.  Thus   equals .003 
and the merger is profitable.                                                                                                                                       
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  An analogous equilibrium and expression can be derived for the profit associated with 
two followers merging.  The three types of firms now include the merged follower, the n-m-2 
excluded followers and the m leaders.  The critical difference is: 
                                                                                                            (4) 
While the full expression for (3) is available from the authors,   collapses to the 
expression for a merger among followers as presented by Huck et al. (2001) for the case of linear 
costs: .   
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3.  Identifying Critical Levels of Cost Convexity 
 
By plugging in specific values of n and m, (2) can be solved for the critical value of c such that 
the profit gain from the merger of two leaders is zero.  For all of the values of n and m there 
exists only a single positive root. Values above that root return positive profit and values below 
that root return negative profit.  As an illustration,  crosses the X-axis from 
negative to positive only once at the value c = 0.55.  This is shown in Figure 1.  Also shown in 
Figure 1 are the graphs retaining three leaders but decreasing n to 4 (increasing the critical c) and 
increasing n to 8 (decreasing the critical c). In both both cases m=3.While such simulation lacks 
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2 As an alternative,   = 0 can be solved for c in general as a function of n and m. This 
yields five roots and while the relevant root is not analytically tractable, it can be plotted in three 
dimensions and shown to be positive. 
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  Similarly, plugging in specific values of n and m into (3) allows solving for the critical 
value of c such that the profit gain from the merger of two followers is zero.  There exists only a 
single positive root for all values of n and m except when n - m =2.  In the case of only two 
followers there are two roots requiring a bit of care in identifying critical regions. 
  The results of our simulations are presented in Table I.  The Maple program that 
generated the table and other results is available upon request.  Table entries are the values of c 
sufficiently high that a two firm merger will be profitable.  The top entry is for a merger between 
leaders and bottom entry is for a merger between followers.  We collect our observations into a 
series of regularities that flow from the simulations illustrated in the table. 
 
Table I: Minimum Conditions for a Profitable Simultaneous Merger 
  Critical Cost Parameter, c, Stackelberg 
  m=2  m=4  M=6  m=8  m=10 
n-m=2 0 
0.15     3.60* 
3.00 
0.10    9.30*
8.63 
0.09    15.2*
14.53 
0.09    21.2*
20.47 











































  Critical Cost Parameter, c, Cournot** 
  n=2  n=4  n=6  n=8  n=10 
  0 4.50  10.42  16.40  22.38 
*Wherever there are two followers all values below the first entry and above the second entry are 
profitable. 
**The values for Cournot come from Heywood and McGinty (2007b). 
 
Regularity 1: As the number of followers (leaders) increases, the critical degree of convexity for 
two leaders to profitably merge decreases (increases). 
 
Thus, leaders are more likely to be able to profitably merge when there are relatively few of them 
but relatively many followers.  In these circumstances, the merged leaders have few same stage 
competitors (increasing output in response to their reduction) and they enjoy leadership over 
many firms. This regularity provides insight into merger dynamics as well.  As the number of 
leaders falls because of merger, the critical degree of convexity falls with it.  Thus, if the 
convexity allows the original merger, additional mergers between leaders will be profitable. 
 
Regularity 2: As either the number of leaders increases, or as the number of followers increases, 
the degree of convexity for two followers to merge increases. 
 
Followers are placed at a disadvantage for merging both my more same stage competitors and 
more leaders that incorporate their desired quantity reduction. Again, similar implications result 
  4for merger dynamics.  If the convexity is sufficient to allow the original merger of two followers, 
this regularity suggests that further mergers between followers will be profitable as well. 
 
Regularity 3: The convexity required for two leaders to profitably merge exceeds that necessary 
for two followers to profitably merge (with the exception of when there are only two followers). 
 
This reflects the timing advantage of the leaders.  Merged followers will have their desired 
output reduction taken into account in the first stage quantity setting of the leaders resulting in a 
smaller decline in market output than that associated with a merger among leaders. 
 
Regularity 4: Holding the total number of firms constant, the degree of cost convexity for either 
two leaders or two followers to merge is lower than for two Cournot competitors to merge. 
 
The results for Cournot in Table I show, for instance, a critical value of 16.40 for 2 of 8 firms to 
merge.  This exceeds the critical level for followers or leaders when there are 8 firms in a market 
with Stackelberg leadership (for instance, compare to 4 leaders and 4 followers).  Thus, 
separating the stages of quantity choice blunts the reaction to the quantity reduction undertaken 
by the merged firms resulting in a lower needed level of cost convexity.  
  An important portion of the merger paradox is the free-rider aspect.  It is often more 
advantageous for firms to remain excluded rivals rather than merged.  While it is possible to 
model mergers that harm rivals, these have been the exception rather than the rule (Farrell and 
Shapiro 1990; Heywood and McGinty 2007a).  The introduction of the stage game even with 
convex costs does not change this as excluded rivals continue to benefit from merger. 
 
Regularity 5: Mergers of either two leaders or of two followers will result in increased profits for 
the excluded firms at both stages. 
 
The profit of an excluded leader post merger is subtracted from the pre-merger leader profit.  
This is set equal to zero and solved for a critical c in terms of m and n.  While there are two real 
roots, both are negative and all values of the profit difference are positive for c above the critical 
level.  This can be repeated for followers.  As the degree of convexity is constrained to be non-
negative, excluded firms benefit from the merger of two leaders.  The merged leader reduces its 
output compared to its pre-merger constituent firms.  While it can earn profit from doing so with 
sufficient convexity, excluded firms gain for any degree of convexity.  Examining the merger of 
two followers required returning to our simulations.  Nonetheless, all our trials show both 




Sufficient convexity generates profitable mergers between two leaders and between two 
followers.  The degree of convexity required for two leaders to merge is generally far smaller 
than that required for two followers to merge.  Most importantly, the structure of the stage game 
means that the degrees of convexity required for either two followers to merge or for two leaders 
to merge are each less than that required for two of n Cournot competitors to merger.  Thus, 
given convex costs, profitable merger between similar firms is more likely in a market 
characterized by Stackelberg leadership.  
  5 
References: 
 
Creane, A., and C. Davidson (2004) “Multidivisional Firms, Internal Competition and the 
Merger Paradox” Canadian Journal of Economics 37, 951–977. 
 
Daughety, A.F. (1990) “Beneficial Concentration” American Economic Review 80, 1231–1237. 
 
Deneckere, R., and C. Davidson (1985) “Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand 
Competition” Rand Journal of Economics 16, 473–486. 
 
Farrell, J., and C. Shapiro (1990) “Horizontal Merger: An Equilibrium Analysis” American 
Economic Review 80, 107–26. 
 
Heywood, J.S., and M. McGinty (2007a) “Leading and Merging: Convex Costs, Stackelberg and 
the Merger Paradox” Southern Economic Journal, Forthcoming. 
 
Heywood, J.S., and M. McGinty (2007b) “Convex Costs and the Merger Paradox Revisited” 
Economic Inquiry 45, 342-349. 
 
Huck, S., K.A. Konrad, and W. Muller (2004) “Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost 
Advantages: The Role of Internal Organization, Information and Market Structure” Economica 
71, 575–587. 
 
Huck, S., K.A. Konrad, and W. Muller (2001) “Big Fish Eat Small Fish: On Merger in 
Stackelberg Markets” Economics Letters 73, 213–217. 
 
Perry, M., and R.H. Porter (1985) “Oligopoly and Incentive for Horizontal Merger” American 
Economic Review 75, 219–227. 
 
Rothschild,R., J.S. Heywood, and K. Monaco (2000) “Spatial Price Discrimination and the 
Merger Paradox” Regional Science and Urban Economics 30, 491–506. 
 
Salant, S.W., S. Switzer, and R.J. Reynolds (1983) “Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects 
of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 98, 185–199. 
 
 
  6